Three months ago German voters rejected the colorless status quo. The two traditional governing parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD), hemorrhaged votes, together barely collecting half the total, which was down two-thirds from four years before.
The liberal Free Democrats reentered the Bundestag. More dramatically, the right-wing, anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany (AfD) won almost 13 percent of the vote and became the third largest party. The hard left Die Linke and Greens completed the spectrum, leaving a sharply divided body. Counting the Christian Social Union (CSU), which runs only in Bavaria, seven parties now sit in parliament.
The CDU and CSU saw many of their voters shift to the AfD; with an election next year in Bavaria, the CSU is particularly determined to take a tougher stance on immigration. The SDP continued to lose supporters on the moderate left who saw their old party as a shill for Chancellor Angela Merkel’s rule after Martin Schulz, the leader of Germany’s Social Democrats, firmly ruled out a new “grand coalition,” insisting that his party would go into opposition. The FDP also felt used by Chancellor Merkel during its time as coalition partner, which ended in its electoral elimination in 2013.
For understandable reasons, the (West) Germany reborn from World War II emphasized stability. The Bundestag cannot be easily dissolved and parties must hit a five percent threshold to enter. Until the absorption of East Germany, there was no party to the left of the SPD. Until September, no party to the right of the CDU/CSU sat in the Bundestag.
No one knows how Germany’s political games will end, but another grand coalition would again advertise the bankruptcy of Germany’s political system and its need for more radical change.
Chancellor since 2005, Merkel advertised herself as being a pair of “safe hands” for Germany. But she, more than anyone else, is responsible for the rise of the political extremists. By squeezing serious disagreement and debate out of the political system, she destroyed the credibility of the centrist parties, fueling Die Linke and the AfD.
During her first term, Merkel ruthlessly stole issues from the SPD, minimizing the differences between the two parties. That allowed her to win a noteworthy victory in 2009 over her partners after their first grand coalition. She then joined with the FDP, but thwarted its pro-business agenda in their coalition rule through 2013. Having seemingly governed without purpose, the Free Democrats dropped from 14 percent of the vote in the previous election to less than five percent, and thus fell out of the Bundestag. That led to another grand coalition, further mixing the positions of the two parties. Both lost heavily in September; the SPD no longer even looks like a governing party, receiving a dismal one-fifth share of ballots.
The issue that proved most damaging was immigration. Amid the onrush of refugees from the Middle East and elsewhere, Germany in 2015 took in a million people, mostly men and mostly Muslim. The social consequences, though not as dire as sometimes forecast, were serious. Merkel’s ratings dropped and the AfD surged. As the number of refugees subsequently dropped the chancellor hoped to repeat her past dominance. But then the CDU/CSU suffered its worst result since 1949, looking good only in comparison with the hapless Social Democrats.
The SPD rejected another turn as junior partner and Merkel placed the AfD beyond the pale, leaving the only option to form a stable government the so-called Jamaica coalition, the CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens, whose combined party colors matched those of the Jamaican flag. But agreement on a common program was hindered by the Greens’ support for immigration, antagonism to economic growth, and enthusiasm for the European Union. The FDP eventually walked out, arguing that the differences were too great—and apparently believing Merkel again was undercutting the Free Democrats.
Germany could run an election repeat, but polls suggest little change in the result, leaving the problem unsolved. Merkel could set up a minority government, seeking support from other parties on an issue-by-issue basis. However, this has never been done in the new Germany and runs against the broad desire for stable governance. So pressure increased on the SDP to reverse course and agree to form another grand coalition.
Schulz soon caved. The party decided to formally enter into discussions with the CDU/CSU at its congress in early December. Andrea Nahles, the SPD Bundestag leader, said that “it’s no more and no less than having talks at the moment.” She also said, “It’s not automatic that we’ll end up in a grand coalition.” Theoretically, the talks could lead to new elections or a CDU/CSU minority government. However, Merkel has dismissed the latter possibilities, and most observers expect another grand coalition to result.
That might be convenient in the short term, but likely would prove corrosive in the long term. As long as nothing seems to change under the two main parties, voters will be more likely to seek alternatives that offer a choice rather than an echo. That risks further disintegration of the center and a rise of the extremes.
Worse, at the SPD congress Schulz offered an agenda almost certain to accelerate the flight of average patriotic Germans to other parties. He criticized immigration caps, endorsed a “United States of Europe,” proposed defenestrating from the European Union countries, which didn’t agree to a new consolidated government, and advocated a eurozone budget.
Even as an opening bid to the CDU/CSU, this list is likely a nonstarter. The Merkel government opposed previous proposals to transfer more national authority to Brussels. Moreover, the weakened chancellor will have a harder time promoting unpopular policies: the CSU has challenged her in taking a hardline position on immigration. With Bavarian elections looming, it cannot afford to be outflanked on the issue, which fueled the rise of the AfD and has been picked up by the otherwise liberal FDP.
Past bailouts, especially of Greece, also were unpopular with the CDU/CSU rank-and-file even as Merkel won European acclaim for her supposed statesmanship. More important is public opposition: the AfD initially was created in response to the Euro, or common currency. Only later did more xenophobic leaders seize control and focus on immigration. During the abortive “Jamaica” negotiations, the FDP clashed with the Greens over the transfer of more authority to Brussels and also is seeking to strip away dissatisfied CDU/CSU backers.
Indeed, in September the SPD, too, lost votes to the AfD. In fact, the latter’s strongest backing is in what was once East Germany among members of the working class. Unfortunately for Schulz, support for a United States of Europe is far stronger in EU office buildings in Brussels—where he served as president of the European Parliament before returning to Berlin—than the streets of Saxony, which is where people feel left behind in post-unification Germany.
Thus, campaigning to transfer more of the nation’s sovereignty to the European superstate is likely to lose more votes to the AfD than the number gained from the Greens, the strongest repository of “Eurocratic” sentiment. Forcing such views onto a renewed grand coalition almost certainly would accelerate flight from an already much shrunken center. Voters would become even more desperate to find, yes, an “alternative for Germany,” whether the AfD or someone else.
Even if Merkel rebuffed Schulz’s agenda for EU aggrandizement, another round of mushy coalition government likely would frustrate anyone dissatisfied with continued government at the lowest common denominator. The main parties would have proved themselves to have no role other than guardians of the status quo, encouraging a further fracturing of the political system. Change would require voting for someone else. France, Greece and Spain all have gone through this process, with once dominant parties reduced to fringe status, while new left-wing and nationalist groupings dominate.
Germany has an additional concern with the AfD. Although not a fascist party, despite its illiberal positions and rhetoric, the AfD has moved politics to the right of the CDU/CSU. The AfD could further drift toward extremism—nationalists defeated moderates at its recent party congress—opening historic wounds. That is more likely if the CDU/CSU joins with the SPD, again demonstrating that there is not so much as a euro of difference between the main parties.
Although Merkel undoubtedly feels more comfortable with the center-left, which shares her belief in little other than governing, she should consider trying to forge a coalition with the FDP and AfD. Forging another formless, valueless coalition primarily intended to ensure outsiders stay out is only likely to increase the appeal of the AfD. Indeed, the latter would become the formal opposition in the Bundestag, making it the most visible agent of change.
As it stands, a reduction in immigration/refugee admissions seems inevitable, given the CSU’s demands. Chancellor Merkel could use that shift to pull the AfD outsiders into government, forcing uncomfortable responsibility upon them. It wouldn’t be a step into the unknown. Other European nations have faced similar challenges in forming majority coalitions. In Austria and Finland, for instance, right-wing nationalists were co-opted and found it tough to be bomb-throwers while participating in government.
No one knows how Germany’s political games will end, but another grand coalition would again advertise the bankruptcy of Germany’s political system and its need for more radical change. It would be better for the establishment parties to acknowledge people’s frustrations by addressing their criticisms. If not, German voters might eventually decide to empower new, less acceptable governing parties.Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have attacked their neighbor, Qatar, for supposedly supporting terrorism. They pretend to be firefighters, but spent years as arsonists. Over the years the Saudis, in particular, financed and staffed terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, which staged the 9/11 attacks. Riyadh’s record has since improved, but only under strong U.S. pressure.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been consolidating power, essentially turning a consensual, familial autocracy into a more traditional personal dictatorship. Most recently he has been detaining and shaking down wealthy family members, an act akin to a criminal gang adjusting members’ shares after a big heist.
Worse, he is thought to have decided on the bloody intervention in Yemen, which has turned a longstanding civil war into a sectarian conflict and killed thousands of civilians. The only positive so far of his de facto reign is his recent decision to liberalize Saudi social life. Women now can breathe and even drive.
However, he has not relaxed political or religious controls. Most important, while limiting the influence of fundamentalist clerics at home, he has not yet dropped the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s longstanding support for radical Islamism abroad. Indeed, he might seek to pacify discontented Imams by further channeling their intolerance toward the West.
Saudi Arabia continues to promote radical Wahhabism and create a breeding ground for terrorists.
The KSA spends as much as $4 billion annually promoting its uniquely intolerant brand of Salafist Islamic thought, aimed at the “purification” of the faith known as Wahhabism. By enforcing this rigidly intolerant theology the KSA has acted like a housebroken version of the Islamic State. People have been similarly oppressed and brutalized, but with a veneer of legality. In contrast, ISIS reflects, argued Princeton’s Bernard Haykel, “a kind of untamed Wahhabism.”
Indeed, the two powers used the same school textbooks. Reported the New York Times: “The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group’s territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.” What has been the impact? Even some Saudi commentators noted that upwards of 4,000 Saudi youth may have joined ISIS in Syria, second only to the number of Tunisians. KSA sent more suicide bombers to Iraq than did any other nation and thousands of other ISIS sympathizers were arrested in Saudi Arabia. Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudis and Osama bin Laden was educated in the KSA. Turkish cleric Mehmet Gormez asked a group of Saudi clerics about 45 Saudis executed for terrorist offenses: “These people studied Islam for 10 or 15 years in your country. Is there a problem with the educational system”?
If MbS, as the crown prince is known, is serious about reform, he and his people should look inward. Of course, the Saudi royals prefer to sell oil to Westerners rather than kill them. But until now sectarian intolerance and religious hatred formed the Kingdom’s foundation. Complained former Sen. Bob Graham, who served on the 9/11 commission: “They have continued, maybe accelerated their support for the most extreme form of Islam.” Which, unfortunately, has created breeding grounds for terrorists.
Wahhabism originated in the 18th century. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab preached renewal, simplification, and purification of Islam. In the Arabian Peninsula he allied with Muhammad bin Saud, who employed the sword to transform the recalcitrant. Al-Wahhab apparently declared jihad against tribes which resisted his teachings, though it primarily was bin Saud’s son, Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad, who turned Wahhabism into “an instrument of state terror,” argued Karen Armstrong in the New Statesman.
The political and religious formed a brutal partnership. Reported the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy: “The political vision of Muhammad ibn Saud sought to unite all of the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula under his authority, while the religious vision of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was to purge the land of beliefs and practices that, according to his strict interpretation of theology, contaminated its Islamic identify.” Wahhabism remained the driving theological force of what became the bin Saud dynasty, though the movement’s impact varied over time.
Creation of the Kingdom in 1932 led to a fateful deal: Wahhabists would channel political Islam to buttress rule by the ibn Saud family, who in turn would enforce Wahhabist doctrines. As ICRD put it: “Political obedience, then, was made an Islamic duty, and Salafist obedience was made a royal obligation.” (The later Muslim Brotherhood emphasized piety but not obedience to political authorities.)
The rise of oil prices in the 1970s allowed the royals to live luxuriously while funding Islamic radicalism. In 1979 the Iranian Revolution and attack on Mecca’s Grand Mosque by Islamists calling for the monarchy’s overthrow caused the royals to double down. They imposed greater social restrictions, especially on women, empowered the religious police, and offered increased financial support for Salafists who backed the regime’s legitimacy. In this way the political and religious authorities long reinforced each other’s authority.
In recent years the Saudi royals have spent $3 to $4 billion a year, roughly $100 billion cumulatively, on educational fellowships and scholarships, Islamic clergy and scholars, academics and journalists, construction projects — madrassahs, mosques, universities, and Islamic centers — operating funds, and school materials. Thus, while Wahhabism is a minority view even within Sunni Islam, it accounts for the vast majority of outside funding. Abdurrahman Wahid, a moderate Muslim who once served as Indonesia’s president and headed the Islamic organization Nahdlatal Ulama, said that “Wahhabi/Salafi ideology has made substantial inroads throughout the Muslim world” because of the Saudis’ wealth.
Wahhabism falls within the larger Salafist movement, which extends well beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Scholars disagree over the exact relationship. Some view Wahhabism as a subset of Salafism, while others contend that the two strains of thought essentially have melded into one. In either case, Wahhabism is hostile to America and Americans’ values.
Of particular concern is the Kingdom’s educational efforts, which are directed at radicalizing all who use them. Textbooks and other materials tend to show anyone who does not profess Wahhabist precepts in, shall we say, a bad light. A number of studies have been conducted over the years, sometimes with difficulty, since Riyadh is not always willing to share its publications. Noted the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, “The consensus findings of these reports demonstrate a consistent pattern of using the educational curriculum to generate a climate of broad-based intolerance for non-Salafist identity groups.”
In its latest report on Saudi Arabia the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom demonstrated its continuing concern over the issue. The Commission acknowledged “additional revisions to remove intolerant passages from textbooks and curricula.” However, USCIRF recommended that more be done to “halt the dissemination of intolerant literature and extremist ideology within Saudi Arabia and around the world” and “revise and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant references that disparage Muslims or non-Muslims or that promote hatred toward other religions or religious groups, a process the Saudi government expected to complete by July 2008.” The Commission worried not only about new textbooks, but the continuing use worldwide of older, more negative books.
For instance, in 2002 the Congressional Research Service reported that the Saudis conceded an internal study had concluded that five percent of the textbook content was “horrible.” A 2003 study by Bader Mousa al-Saif of monotheism texts found degrading attacks on Christians and Jews.
Also in 2003, Eleanor Adbdella Dournato assessed Saudi books. In her judgment, explained ICRD, the texts promoted extremism because of “an aversion to encourage critical thinking and independent reasoning,” leaving students few tools with which to reject charismatic extremist propaganda. The same year a report by Arnon Gross warned that the Saudi materials created an “other” promoted by “a malicious Crusader-Jewish alliance striving to eliminate Islam from all the continents.”
Another 2003 study, by Saudi journalist Ibrahim al-Sakran and former Saudi judge Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-Qassem, reviewed middle and high school texts. The astonishing conclusion: the program “encourages violence toward others, and misguides the pupils into believing that in order to safeguard their own religion, they must violently repress and even physically eliminate the ‘other.’”
Other studies have consistently criticized Saudi (mis)educational materials. A decade ago Freedom House reported that “The material found in these books reveals that the Saudi government continues to propagate an ideology of hate toward the ‘unbeliever,’ which includes Christians, Jews, Shiites, Sufis, Sunni Muslims who do not follow Wahhabi doctrine, Hindus, atheists and others.”
Author Nina Shea updated the study in 2008 and 2011, and found that extremism and intolerance remained even after Riyadh claimed to have cleansed the texts. In 2011 USCIRF warned about Saudi textbooks reflecting intolerance. Four years ago the State Department spent a half million dollars to study Saudi texts but refused to release the results, which embarrassed the Saudis. The New York Times gained access to the study, conducted by the International Center for Religion and Democracy.
The assessment was not entirely negative, but overall, explained, the ICRD: “The Saudi education system is found to promote intolerance over the course of a student’s career in two primary ways: it creates a climate of general prejudice against non-Salafist and non-Muslim groups, and it contains direct discriminatory calls to action — both violence and non-violent. This intolerance is supported through a web of misrepresentation, complicated and contrived identity associations, and the misapplication of selective interpretations of scripture. Such prejudice is not conducive to stability, cooperation and prosperity in a society that includes a large number of foreign residents and workers.” The group listed specific passages to back its judgment.
Noted ICRD: “All the while students are inculcated with fear and hostility toward what conservative Salafist clerics deem to be threats to Islam. Discriminatory and occasionally violent calls to action are scattered throughout the curriculum, and are supported by a litany of charges against the targets. Everything from avoidance to hatred and murder is advocated.”
Earlier this year David Andrew Weinberg of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies assessed Saudi textbooks for the 2016-17 school year. He found that they were more likely to recommend execution for lifestyle choices than the actual practice of the Saudi state. Noted Weinberg: “The language in 2016-2017 Saudi textbooks that calls for killing people who engage in adultery, anal sex, apostasy, or certain supposed acts of sorcery are not the only passages that encourage violence against those who act in a manner inconsistent with the state’s vision of Islam.”
Unsurprisingly, Saudi materials are used around the world in madrassas/schools operated by Riyadh. The textbooks also end up in facilities run by others. Particularly striking is the fact, noted earlier, that the Islamic State used Saudi textbooks. In July Weinberg testified before Congress: “Much like those books recommended, the Islamic State executed numerous individuals on suspicion of homosexuality, insulting Allah or the Prophet Muhammad, adultery, or purported sorcery.” Even many mosques in the U.S. use Saudi materials.
Saudi authorities respond to Western criticism contending that they have cleaned up the textbooks. There have been changes, but with only limited substantive effect. Weinberg reported that “as the author of the most recent published study on incitement remaining in Saudi textbooks today, I can vouch that over a decade later Riyadh still has not persuasively shown that this problem has been resolved.” As the Washington Institute summarized the issue: “Saudi high school-level textbooks continue to feature much inciteful language, promote intolerance, vilify non-Sunni Muslims (including forbidding friendship with ‘infidels’), and spout vile anti-Semitism.”
Riyadh’s lavish support for the otherwise marginal Islamic thought has radicalized Muslims globally. Argued Thomas Hegghammer, a Norwegian terrorism specialist, the Saudis have hindered the sort of moderating evolution seen in Christianity, most notably the Reformation and Second Vatican Council: “If there ever was going to be an Islamic reformation in the 20th Century, the Saudis probably prevented it by pumping out literalism.”
Max Singer of the Hudson Institute argued that Riyadh “drastically increased the size of the radical Muslim population.” Farah Pandith, who visited 80 nations while serving as the State Department’s special representative to Muslims, said, “In each place I visited, the Wahhabi influence was an insidious presence.” The impact varies by country and region. Scott Shane of the New York Times reported that the KSA’s influence was most harmful “in divided countries like Pakistan and Nigeria,” where “the flood of Saudi money, and the ideology it promotes, have exacerbated divisions over religion that regularly prove lethal.”
Admittedly, Wahhabism’s relationship with terrorism remains indirect. It essentially is a theology of hate and intolerance, or what the group Freedom House called an “ideology of religious hatred.” Unfortunately, if you don’t believe other people should be treated with dignity and respect, you are more likely to eventually view them as deserving death.
The American Enterprise Institute’s Katherine Zimmerman classified Wahhabi-Salafist toward the violent jihadist end of the Sunni Islamic spectrum. She explained:
The Salafi-jihadi movement — not simply distinct groups or individuals — threatens the United States, the West, and Muslim communities. The movement draws strength from its ideology, which helps to unify and band together a network of individuals, groups, and organizations seeking a shared global outcome: destruction of current Muslim societies through the use of force and creation of what they regard as a true Islamic society. This network is the Salafi-jihadi base and constitutes the primary source of strength for al Qaeda and ISIS. New groups would form from the movement if the existing ones are ever destroyed.
The consequences have been grave. The ICRD warned: “A number of violent extremists around the world have reported that their radicalization first began when they were exposed to Salafist literature or websites.” Manas Sen Gupta of the website TopYaps contended that “al Nusra, Boko Haram and nearly every single barbaric Islamic terrorist group” adhere to Wahhabism.
Unfortunately, many Wahhabist extremists feel impelled to act. Saudi-born Madawi al-Rashid, then a visiting professor at the London School of Economics, noted that Wahhabism “can be a revolutionary language that would inspire someone to commit atrocities in the name of Islam.” Complained Sen Gupta: “The Wahhabi doctrine will keep on creating terrorists who will keep on killing innocents. It is that doctrine which the fundamentalists use to kill Shias, Christians, Hindus” and others.
More than individuals are at risk. The Islamic Supreme Council of America pointed to the rise of Wahhabism in Central Asia: “Should this radicalized understanding of Islam continue to spread unchecked, radical interpretations could threaten social stability at the local, national, and regional levels and create serious geopolitical dangers to which neighboring powers, as well as the U.S. and Europe, would have to react.” The same applies elsewhere in the world.
Washington long pressed the KSA to cut its support for radical Islamism, but the royals have rarely yielded to Washington on matters involving religion. President Trump claims to be tougher than his predecessors. If so, he should challenge Riyadh’s backing for Wahhabism, which threatens his administration’s agenda. Warned the ICRD: “A failure by Saudi Arabia to thoroughly reform its educational system will directly undermine U.S. foreign policy goals of encouraging moderation and democratic progress within the Islamic world.”
Weinberg makes a similar argument: “addressing incitement in Saudi Arabia, including in textbooks, is a serious national security issue. Saudi society has been a top source of foreign terrorist fighters — and at times, terrorist leaders.” As long as the KSA creates fertile ground for Islamic extremism, America is likely to find terrorists being created faster than they are being killed.
Other nations also have promoted Islamist fundamentalism and intolerance, but Riyadh’s role stands out. Of course, there are other sources of intolerance, which does not inexorably lead to murder or terrorism. Nevertheless, the flood of KSA money promoting Wahhabism has acted as an accelerant, encouraging new violent outbursts and spreading old conflicts around the globe.
Indeed, Riyadh’s malign campaign may help explain why the more effort the U.S. puts into fighting extremist forces abroad, the more violent radicals Washington appears to face. It is essential that America make fewer enemies abroad. Part of that is convincing Washington’s supposed allies to stop spreading hate around the globe. A good place to start would be to insist that the KSA keep its Wahhabist evangelists at home.Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.
**Written by Doug Powers
America: The mainstream media has reached peak stupid these last few weeks.
NBC News: Hold our beer:
Ironically that’s the kind of spin N. Korea’s state media might want to run with.
Predicted next NBC News headline: “Trump’s Anti-Kim Jong-un Policy Poses Threat to N. Korea’s Reliable Electrical Grid”:
**Written by Doug Powers